

A METHODOLOGY FOR DEVELOPING U.S. NAVAL
DOCTRINE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

TEDDY C. CRANFORD, MAJ, USA
B.S., Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS, 1980

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1995

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19950927 120

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
	2 June 1995	Master's Thesis, 2 Aug 94 - 2 Jun 95
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE		5. FUNDING NUMBERS
A Methodology for Developing U.S. Naval Doctrine for the 21st Century		
6. AUTHOR(S)		
Major Teddy C. Cranford, U.S. Army		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900		
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
		
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT		12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited.		A
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)		
<p>This study investigates a methodology to develop naval doctrine for the U.S. Navy. It does not write doctrine, but presents a process to produce a workable doctrine encompassing theory, missions, organization, history, and documents currently in print. The process plans to identify the minimal subjects that naval doctrine must address. It uses the U.S. Army's experience following the Vietnam War as a model for comparison. It contrasts the U.S. Navy's leadership's current initiative to redirect the Navy's primary focus (mission) following the Cold War with that of the U.S. Army's following the Vietnam War. This study provides insights concerning the requirements of implementing new doctrine within a military organization. The study explains why the Navy needs a formal written doctrine, looks at other services' approach to doctrine, and the impact of implementation. It addresses these topics to identify essential elements and corresponding actions.</p>		

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 5

14. SUBJECT TERMS		15. NUMBER OF PAGES	
Doctrine, Naval Doctrine, TRADOC		100	
16. PRICE CODE			
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
Unclassified	Unclassified	Unclassified	Unlimited

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Major Teddy C. Cranford

Thesis Title: A Methodology for Developing Naval Doctrine for the 21st Century

Approved by:

Jacob W. Kipp, Thesis Committee Chairman
Jacob W. Kipp, Ph.D.

Donald D. Hill, Member
Commander Donald D. Hill, M.S.

Joseph G.D. Babb, Member
Mr. Joseph G.D. Babb, M.P.A.

Accepted this 2d day of June 1995 by:

Philip J. Brookes, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement).

ABSTRACT

A METHODOLOGY FOR DEVELOPING U.S. NAVAL DOCTRINE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY,
by MAJ Teddy C. Cranford, USA, 91 pages.

This study investigates a methodology to develop naval doctrine for the U.S. Navy. It does not write actual doctrine, but presents a process to produce a workable doctrine encompassing theory, missions, organization, history, and documents currently in print. The process hopes to identify the minimal subjects that naval doctrine must address.

It uses the U.S. Army's experience following the Vietnam War as a model for comparison. It contrasts the U.S. Navy's leadership's current initiative to redirect the Navy's primary focus (mission) following the Cold War with that of the U.S. Army's following the Vietnam War. This study provides insights concerning the requirements of implementing new doctrine within a military organization.

The study explains why the Navy needs a formal written doctrine, looks at other services' approach to doctrine, and the impact of implementation. It addresses these topics to identify essential elements and corresponding actions, so that those in the other services can appreciate the Navy's path to doctrine development.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The genesis of this paper began in November 1991, when the Commander Naval Surface Force U.S. Atlantic Fleet (COMNAVSURFLANT), Vice Admiral (VADM) J. Paul Reason tasked me to learn about the U.S. Navy. Over the next two and one half years VADM Reason and Captain (USN) Gary W. Zwirschitz took the time and energy to mentor me in the fine art of naval service. They placed enough confidence in my abilities to make me the Command's primary doctrine officer (Joint Warfare Officer, N54) in June 1993.

A special thanks to Commander Gary R. Lennon, who as my mentor and friend took the time to attempt to make me into a surface warfare officer. Our almost daily lessons in naval warfare, traditions, and seamanship gave me a basic knowledge of naval service. Our discussions progressed to employment, tactics, operations, and history of both of our services. In the end, we truly earned our section's title of Joint Warfare and Doctrine.

I also must thank my supervising department heads that supported an Army officer reviewing and commenting on Navy doctrine: Captains Terry L. Glover and Dennis R. Dean (Combat Systems) and Colonel (USMC) Thomas J. Molon (Plans and Policy). Additional thanks go out to my comrades in the N3 and N5 Departments, especially Commanders William H. Roberts and Dennis Hancock.

Finally, I need to thank the members of my staff group (8A) and thesis committee, whose support allowed me to overcome personal setbacks and complete this project. I cannot describe what the support and protection provided by the officers and families of 8A meant to me during November and December 1994. It is also important that I recognize the advice and motivation provided by Professor Jacob Kipp and LTC Daniel Karis that kept me going during some very rough personal times.

Most importantly I need to thank the two officers, who kept me enrolled in the Command and General Staff College (CGSC). Major Cindy-Lee Knapp, who unknowingly gave me the strength to complete CGSC when I was set to resign from the course and Major Richard Kubu and his family, who helped me make it through each day. I thank you both, you made this possible.

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FORWARD

In November 1991, while deployed on Operation Desert Shield/Storm, I received reassignment instructions to the U.S. Army Naval Activity, Norfolk, Virginia. In this assignment I worked for two bosses: the U.S. Army and the U.S. Navy. The Army listed my duty description as the Army Representative and Coordinator to the Commander, Naval Surface force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (COMNAVSURFLANT). In this capacity, I supervised seventeen Army soldiers assigned to COMNAVSURFLANT Commands in the Hampton Roads Virginia area and coordinated Army training aboard Navy ships along the Eastern Seaboard.

The Navy assigned me initially as the Assistant Doctrine and Tactics Officer (N541) in the Combat Systems Department (N5). In May 1993, as a result of a staff reorganization, the N54 office changed to the Joint Warfare Office (N54) and moved to the Plans Department (N5). The N54 office reviewed, wrote, and coordinated joint doctrine, allied tactical publications, Naval Warfare Publications (NWPs), Class Tactical Manuals (CTMs), Combat System Doctrine (CSD), and TACNOTEs and TACMEMOs.

In July 1993, the COMNAVSURFLANT Chief of Staff acting on recommendations from the N5 and N54 appointed me as the Command's Joint Warfare Officer (N54). One of my first tasks in this position was the review of the 28 July 1993 draft of Naval Doctrine Publication 1. This review began a detailed discussion between myself and my Navy coworkers concerning Naval Doctrine. The discussion included comparisons between

the fledgling Naval Doctrine Command and the Army's Training and Doctrine Command. These discussions became the genesis of this thesis.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

On 28 July 1994, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) changed the basic definition of joint doctrine within the U.S. Military. In a memorandum to the Service Chiefs and Commanders of the Unified Commands, the CJCS made joint doctrine authoritative and directive in nature.¹ This change reflected the importance the U.S. military's senior leaders place on joint warfighting.

Joint warfighting implies a certain level of knowledge concerning the capabilities and operations of all the military's services. Service doctrines represent key elements in understanding how the different services operate. In essence, each service doctrine serves as part of the foundation for joint warfighting. This doctrine must exist in a formal written product available for use by the other services. The United States Marine Corps' Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, Warfighting reflects this view in its description of doctrine as "a particular way of thinking about war and a way of fighting . . . doctrine provides the basis for harmonious actions and mutual understanding."²

Current, U.S. Navy doctrine (strategic and operational) relies on an informal system of commander's intent and fleet instructions.³ This system reduces the possibility of standardization within the Navy. Conversely, the tactical level of naval doctrine derives from specific

information and guidance found in the Naval Warfare Publications Library (NWPL). The NWPL provides extensive information concerning tactics, techniques, and procedures for employing shipboard weapon systems. The formal and informal nature of the Navy's doctrine system makes it difficult for members of other services to understand how the Navy will fight.

The Problem

The USN utilizes an extensive NWPL, tactical memorandum(s) (TACMEMOs), tactical note(s) (TACNOTEs), and written instructions to define how to fight individual ships and systems. No current capstone document outlines how the USN intends to conduct military operations as a member of a joint and/or combined team in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) and war. Joint Pub 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations defines these environments of MOOTW and war as containing a range of military operations including both combat and noncombat operations.⁴

Joint Pub 3-0 divides MOOTW into two subcategories: MOOTW involving the use or threat of force and MOOTW not involving the use or threat of force. MOOTW involving the use or threat of force serves to deter war and resolve conflict by conducting operations such as: counterterrorism, strikes, raids, shows of force, peacekeeping, Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), and peace enforcement. MOOTW not involving the use or threat of force serves to promote peace by conducting operations such as: disaster relief, peace building, civil support, nation assistance, NEO, and counterdrug.⁵ War consists of large scale combat operations such as: attack, defend, and blockades.⁶ These combat operations achieve national objectives by concluding

hostilities on terms favorable to the United States and its multinational partners. As such military forces enter war with the intent of fighting to win.

Background

The USN current doctrinal situation resembles the situation of the United States Army after the Vietnam War. The 1973 Paris accords ended nineteen years of active U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. During those nineteen years, a large portion of the U.S. Army based their professional experience on what they learned on the battlefields of Vietnam. After the Vietnam War the U.S. Army began the post-Vietnam drawdown and in 1973 changed to an all volunteer force. These occurrences caused such turmoil within the U.S. Army that it was in danger of losing its institutional identity and pride of purpose. The leadership of the U.S. Army recognized this problem and set out to reorient the Army.⁷

The 1976 version of FM 100-5, Operations, represented the Army's first step in this process. As Paul Herbert observed "The manual attempted to present an overarching concept of warfare that would rationalize everything the Army did, . . . in terms of how the Army intended to fight."⁸ Moreover, the U.S. Army's leadership hoped to refocus the army towards mechanized/armor warfare on an European battlefield drawing on the lessons learned during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. This effort eventually led to the Army's Airland Battle Doctrine contained in the 1982 version of FM 100-5.

Since the end of World War II, the USN has focused its efforts to achieve either command⁹ or control¹⁰ of the sea. During the period

labeled as the Cold War (1947-1990), the USN focused on defeating the Soviet Navy. The Cold War gave the USN's sailors experiences that focused on preparing for a global naval struggle against the Soviet Navy for over forty years. At the same time the Navy fought several local wars: Korea, Vietnam, and The Gulf, while engaged in suasion and presence operations around the world. In 1991, the Navy's Cold War adversary, the Soviet Navy, disappeared, leaving the USN as unchallenged and the single most powerful navy in the world. As a result, the USN found itself without a defining purpose. It, like the other services was in danger of losing its institutional identity and pride of purpose.

In 1973, the U.S. Army's leadership faced the requirement to adapt to an enemy entirely different than the one the Army faced for seven intense years, in a different theater, with a changing force structure, facing challenges posed by emerging technology, and an American society more concerned with domestic issues rather than international security. The U.S. Army's leaders adopted a strategy that used doctrine as the instrument to meet the challenges that faced the Army. This resulted in the U.S. Army establishing the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) as the organization to implement this strategy of change.

In 1992, the U.S. Navy's leadership faced a threat environment entirely different than the one it faced for over forty years, in a different international setting, with a changing force structure, challenges from emerging technology, and an American society more concerned with domestic issues rather than security issues. In addition, the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act necessitated

the need for joint operations. This required the services to facilitate coordination at all levels designed to increase cooperation, understanding, and coordination.

To meet these challenges the U.S. Navy's leadership adopted the same strategy that the U.S. Army used in 1972 and again in 1992. In 1992, The Secretary of the Navy published ". . . From the Sea, Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century."¹¹ The paper marked a major redirection of the USN from command/control of the sea to littoral warfare. Simultaneously the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) laid the ground work to establish the Naval Doctrine Command (NDC) under the CNO's control.¹²

The NDC's responsibilities included consolidating the Naval Warfare Publication Library and development of formal naval doctrine. The latter task recognized a shortcoming within the Navy dating back at least to Alfred T. Mahan's 1890 book The Influence of Seapower Upon History. During this period, the Navy relied upon local instructions, ship's captain's instructions, traditions, and a shared experience of the officer corps to conduct operations. In essence, the Navy used a system of informal doctrine supporting independent ship operations for almost 200 years. Use of this informal system for such a long time required the USN to start from the beginning to codify this informal naval doctrine.

Direction of Research

This lack of an existing formal doctrine meant the USN did not possess a methodology for developing or updating naval doctrine. This void contributed to the normal disruption, delays, and disagreements

encountered during the development of doctrine as the USN prepared Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare.¹³ The NDC found itself at the bottom of the learning curve in the attempt to develop naval doctrine. The first draft issued in July 1993 reflected this problem and required a significant revision based on inputs from the Atlantic Fleet's Operational Commands.¹⁴ This revised draft issued 8 October 1993 provided the basis for the final publication issued in March 1994.

This thesis studies the U.S. Navy's decision to develop doctrine and takes a detailed look at the requirements of doctrine by studying published documents, theory, and history. This identifies the minimum subjects required for the development of doctrine. The goal of the thesis is to examine the problem of a methodology for doctrine development that will assist others to understand the USN's approach to develop doctrine.

Thesis Question

To achieve the goal of this thesis requires answering the following question, what major areas does the USN need to consider in developing naval doctrine for the 21st century? This primary thesis question generates the requirement to answer the following subordinate questions:

1. Why develop doctrine?
2. How has the Army's approach to doctrine influenced the NDC?
3. How do the following factors impact doctrine: theory, history, roles and missions, bureaucratic politics, and strategic requirements?
4. What has been the impact of implementation?

Limitations of the Thesis

The paper will not encompass, promote, or write naval doctrine. It will identify, address, and support essential areas/topics that hopefully will aid the USN in developing doctrine. It will address topics, so that those in the other services can appreciate the Navy's path to doctrine development. The paper uses examples to reinforce or clarify selected topics/areas.

Delimitations of the Thesis

The paper will use the 1994 National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement for the United States and the National Military Strategy of the United States to derive possible roles and functions for the USN into the 21st century. It will address naval doctrine in general terms without addressing specifics such as the Navy-Marine team relationship. In the case of amphibious doctrine the study defers to Joint Pub 3-02. Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations.¹⁵

Significance of the Study

In 1915, Lieutenant Commander (LCDR) Dudley Knox, USN, wrote the following,

The object of military doctrine is to furnish a basis of prompt and harmonious conduct by the subordinate commanders of a large military force, in accordance with the intentions of the commander-in-chief, but without the necessity for referring each decision to superior authority before action is taken.¹⁶

LCDR Knox understood the impact of technology on naval warfare and the necessity to weld independent ship operations into a single collective force to achieve objectives. Almost eighty years later, the U.S. Navy still does not possess a working, formal, capstone, doctrine document. The Army, Air Force, and Marines possess basic doctrine, what has

prevented the Navy from developing its own? This study will address how the Navy has sought to develop its doctrine by grouping its findings into four main areas: theory, strategy, doctrine, and other pertinent information.

Definitions of key terms used in the Thesis

Combined Doctrine. Fundamental principles that guide the employment of two or more nations in coordinated action toward a common objective. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Conflict. The period characterized by confrontation and the need to engage in hostilities other than to secure strategic objectives.¹⁷

Doctrine. Fundamental principles by which military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. (Joint Publication 1-02)

Engagement. The process of exercising U.S. national power to selectively maintain stable political and economic relations to provide for the U.S.' strategic security.¹⁸

Enhancement. U.S. strategy that requires utilizing U.S. military forces to accomplish national security objectives. This strategy includes the ability with regional allies, to win two nearly simultaneous, major, regional conflicts; pursuing arms control agreements; and promoting stability.¹⁹

Force Projection. The movement of military forces from the continental United States (CONUS) or a theater in response to requirements of war or military operations other than war (MOOTW).²⁰

Joint Doctrine. Fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more Services in coordinated action toward common objective.²¹

Littoral. Those regions relating to or existing on a shore or coastal region within direct control of and vulnerable to the striking power of naval expeditionary forces.²²

Naval Expeditionary Forces (NEF). A cohesive, task organized Navy-Marine Corps team operating forward, capable of a broad range of options that can initiated from the sea.²³

Operational maneuver from the sea. The application of maneuver warfare to littoral areas. It aims at decisive results by seeking and striking at a critical vulnerability.²⁴

Peacetime. (1) attempts to influence world events through those actions that routinely occur between nations.²⁵ (2) Time or period of peace.²⁶

Power projection. The unconditional ability to use combined arms in applying high intensity, precise offensive power at the time and location of the nation's choosing.²⁷

Strategy. The art and science of employing the armed forces and other elements of national power during peace, conflict, and war to secure national security objectives.²⁸

Unified Command. A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components

of two or more services, and which is established and so designated by the President . . . or, when so authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by a commander of an existing unified command.²⁹

War. The use of force in combat operations against an armed enemy.³⁰

Organization of the Thesis

Chapter 1 provides the introduction of the topic, direction of research, limitations, importance of the research, and outlines the study.

Chapter 2 Literature Review - The chapter discusses the historical writings of fundamental theorists in the U.S. military strategic process, current doctrinal practices within the U.S. armed forces, and other pertinent issues that impact doctrine development. The chapter studies the impact of strategic theory on doctrine development within the U.S. armed services. This relationship between strategy and doctrine provides the start point for understanding U.S. doctrine development.

The chapter moves on to study the current capstone doctrine publications of the U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force (USAF), and U.S. Marine Corps (USMC). This provides insights into the methodology currently in use by the U.S. armed forces. Finally, the chapter reviews other pertinent issues/documents that impact on the development of U.S. military doctrine. Other pertinent issues include items such as Presidential and Congressional policies and guidance, Department of Defense (DOD) doctrinal guidance and initiatives, evolving doctrinal

thought, and scholarly works. These three areas complete a systemic study of doctrine development.

Chapter 3 contains an organizational background of the Naval Doctrine Command. This chapter also addresses the establishment of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and applies the lessons learned from that experience to the NDC. The chapter concludes with a short analysis of the NDC in relation to TRADOC.

Chapter 4 takes the information from the literature review and builds a model of war. This model of war serves as the start point for analyzing the formulation of naval doctrine. The components of the model become the key topics required for doctrine development.

Chapter 5 contains the conclusions derived from the research and recommends further research in the field of study.

Endnotes

¹Memorandum from the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Subject: Joint Doctrine, (Washington, DC: 28 July 1994).

²Department of the Navy, Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, Warfighting, (Washington, DC: 1989), 43.

³James J. Tritton, "Lessons and Conclusions From the History of Navy and Military Doctrinal Development," 2.

⁴U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1993), I-3.

⁵Ibid., I-3 & I-4.

⁶Ibid., I-2.

⁷Paul H. Herbert, Deciding What Has to be Done: General William E. Depuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations, Leavenworth Papers Number 16, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, July 1988), 5.

⁸Ibid., 1.

⁹Alfred T. Mahan's principle thesis of naval doctrine proposed in The Influence of Seapower Upon History, (New York, NY: Hill and Wang, 1957).

¹⁰Julian S. Corbett's principle thesis of naval doctrine in Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988).

¹¹Sean O'Keefe, "...From the Sea, Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century," (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy White Paper, September 1992).

¹²Department of the Navy, Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5450.16, Naval Doctrine Command, Washington DC, 25 Sept 92, and Department of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Commandant of the Marine Corps, Charter of the Naval Doctrine Command (NDC), (Washington, DC: #00/3U500015, 29 Jan 93), enclosure 1.

¹³U.S. Navy, Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare, (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, [1st draft 28 July 1993, 2d draft 8 October 1993] 28 March 1994).

¹⁴Naval Commands of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet reviewed the 28 July 1993 draft of NDP-1 during August 1993. Based on their review, the NDC produced a revised draft dated 8 October 1993. The review of this draft resulted in the final version issued 28 March 1994.

¹⁵U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Pub 3-02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1992).

¹⁶Dudley W. Knox, "The Role of Doctrine in Naval Warfare," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, March-April 1915), 334.

¹⁷U.S. Army, FM 100-5, Operations July 1993, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army), 1993, g-2.

¹⁸Clinton, William, "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement of the United States," (Washington, DC: The White House, July 1994), 5.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰U.S. Army, FM 100-5, Operations, g-4.

²¹U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Pub 1-02, Definitions and Terms, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 11 Nov 1991).

²²U.S. Navy, Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare, (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1994), 73.

²³Ibid., 60.

²⁴Sean O'Keefe, "...From the Sea, Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century," 3.

²⁵Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations, g-7.

²⁶The Random House College Dictionary, revised edition, edited by Jess Stein, (New York, NY: Random House, Inc., 1980), 977.

²⁷U.S. Navy, Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare, 64.

²⁸Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations, g-8.

²⁹U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Pub 1-02, Definitions and Terms.

³⁰Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations, g-9.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

Carl von Clausewitz wrote "War is merely the continuation of policy by other means."¹ He made this statement during a period when the sovereign authority of a state/nation rested in the monarch. These monarchs, like the King of Prussia, conducted foreign and internal state affairs, set taxes, and commanded the country's army (military). Clausewitz stated the obvious to describe the relationship between war and politics in the early to mid-nineteenth century.

He also said that war seeks to emancipate itself from political policy during its course.² This results from the fact that war tends to move toward the absolute in its prosecution. Armies (military) fight to win wars, to do so requires a total effort on the part of the army and nation. The extended effort takes priority over the nation until victory (or at least until it is assured) and distorts the political foundation. This is a grave risk to states and nations.³

Clausewitz's statement applies as much today to the United States as it did to Prussia in the nineteenth century. The "Constitution of the United States of America" establishes a Republic that derives the ability to govern from the people. Article II designates the President, the Commander in Chief of the military. Yet, Article I grants only the Congress the authority to make declarations of

war and the ability to levy and collect taxes required to raise and support a military. The untested 1973 War Powers Act further defines this division of power by limiting the President's ability to commit United States (U.S.) military forces without congressional approval. War (for the U.S.) remains a continuation of politics by other means.

In this case the politics are republican and popular. This system of military control comes from and perpetuates the notion that Americans are uneasy about a large standing military. As such, the American People are reluctant to use military power and only under circumstances where the U.S. is clearly protecting its vital interests. In these cases American public opinion supports the use of the military and expects a quick and relatively painless victory.⁴ So, Clausewitz's statement applies narratively and precisely to the United States' political-military relationship.

This relationship defines how the U.S. views its military establishment and creates a link between theory, strategy, and doctrine. The U.S. military serves as one of four instruments of national power and the last the country actively applies to a situation/crisis. The nation, however, uses the threat of military actions through presence and suasion operations to facilitate the success of the other three instruments of national power. The way the U.S. applies its military forces requires an understanding of the relationship between theory and strategy and their impact on doctrine.

Theory

Theory provides the basic principles that guide how the United States views war. Three theoretical models of war exist:

eschatological, cataclysmic, and rational.⁵ The eschatological war model views war as part of some grand design creating or achieving some ultimate end state. Eschatological war supports the practice of religious holy wars. The cataclysmic war model views war as a great abnormal catastrophe or disease, that timely and correct preventive measures might advert. This view results from the 18th century enlightenment. The rational war model describes war as one of several instruments of policy, to be applied thoughtfully through a planned strategy. Napoleon and Clausewitz demonstrated that this strategy attains the end state of policy, rational war is thus conducting politics by violent means.⁶ U.S. National psyche embraces all three models often simultaneously.

The United States of America, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, July 1994 (ns) represents the annual capstone security document of the United States. Title VI of the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 requires that the President prepare and submit an annual report on the national security strategy of the United States.⁷ In response to this requirement of law, the President generates the NSS. Using guidance from the President, the National Security Advisor prepares the NSS.

The NSS publicly details the national security objectives of the United States. The 1994 NSS sets three main security goals for the United States. They are: to credibly sustain our security with military forces that are ready to fight, to bolster America's economic revitalization, and to promote democracy abroad.⁸

The 1994 NSS tasks the military to maintain the ability in concert with regional allies to win two, nearly-simultaneous, major regional conflicts. It also tasks the military to enhance the security of the U.S. by providing a credible overseas presence, countering weapons of mass destruction (deterrence and anti-proliferation), contributing to multilateral peace operations, supporting counter terrorism, and supporting other national security objectives.⁹

The National Military Strategy of the United States of America: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement, February 1995,¹⁰ (NMS) translates the NSS into military terms. It defines the international environment, outlines the military's objectives, and sets the strategy to accomplish those objectives. The end state is the NSS's goal of a worldwide community of free market democracies.¹¹

The current NMS provides a list of four dangers currently existing in the international environment: regional instability, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, transnational dangers (i.e., drug trafficking and terrorism), and the dangers to democracy and reform in the former Soviet Union.¹² The military strategy must contribute to counteracting these dangers to successfully support the obtainment of national security goals. The national military objectives of this strategy are the promotion of stability and thwarting aggression.¹³

The strategy encompasses three sets of tasks designed to accomplish these national military objectives: peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention, and fighting and winning our Nation's wars. Two strategic concepts of employing military forces

support these objectives. They are overseas presence and power projection. To execute these concepts requires capable, trained, and properly equipped forces.¹⁴

Peacetime engagement describes non-combat operations executed by the Nation's Armed Forces to demonstrate the commitment to stability and democracy.¹⁵ It includes operations such as: military-to-military contacts, nation assistance, security assistance, humanitarian operations, counterdrug and counterterrorism, and peacekeeping.¹⁶ Deterrence and conflict prevention operations attempt to convince potential adversaries that the U.S. will not allow aggression to go unpunished. This component includes such subtasks as: nuclear deterrence, regional alliances, crisis response, arms control, NEO, sanction enforcement, and peace enforcement.¹⁷ The ability to fight and win the Nation's wars remains the military's foremost responsibility and the prime consideration of military activities.¹⁸ The NMS sets out the following principles for warfighting: set clear objectives and apply decisive force, project the necessary power, fight combined and jointly, win the information war, counter weapons of mass destruction and improve capability to operate in contaminated environments, initiate force preparations to handle a second major regional contingency, generate required forces, and begin plans to win the peace at the outset of the conflict.¹⁹ NMS is a transient document for a dynamic world.

Naval Theory

In his book The Influence of Seapower Upon History, Alfred Mahan (1840-1914) professed that the key to national greatness rested upon maritime strength. A graduate of Annapolis, Alfred T. Mahan was an

average naval officer until Commodore Stephen B. Luce (President of the Naval War College) invited him to lecture at the Naval War College in 1884.²⁰ As a result of his lecture (based on Commodore Luce's request), the Navy assigned Mahan to the faculty of the Naval War College. Mahan studied the history of maritime nations to develop corresponding theories of seapower. These theories of seapower shaped naval strategic thought until after World War I.²¹

Mahan proclaimed that seapower properly used increased the options available to a nation in times of crisis. His main thesis centered on the requirement of seapower to obtain national greatness by guaranteeing access to trade and markets. He viewed seapower as an integral tool of national policy especially during periods of war.

The application of seapower in times of war could achieve national objectives by destroying the enemy fleet at sea. In Mahan's writings, a navy achieved this command of the sea by winning a climatic sea battle between opposing battle fleets. Once this occurred, navies would blockade the enemy's ports (both close and distant blockades) to deny use of the sea to the opposing side. Mahan saw this inability to use the sea as devastating to the enemy's war effort.²²

The weaker opponent sought to draw the stronger fleet into a naval battle under terms favoring it. It would avoid a climatic battle if its naval forces were so inferior as to risk annihilation. In this case, it sought to husband its fleet to maintain a "fleet-in-being" that limited the ability of the dominant maritime power to exercise the options that command of the sea should have brought to it.²³

Once a nation established command of the sea, it could concentrate on the objective ashore. Mahan noted that history showed the great antagonists of any period of world history were normally separated by a body of water. If not separated by water, at least one antagonist drew its power base from seapower. Mahan based his thesis upon the role of naval power in the age of sail, but he wrote when steam and steel were already transforming navies. The age of steam and steel navies would severely challenge Mahan's thesis.

Sir Julian Stafford Corbett's Some Principles of Maritime Strategy took a very different perspective from Mahan and looked at naval operations in view of the rapidly emerging technologies of the late nineteenth century. Trained as a lawyer, Corbett became one of Britain's greatest maritime strategists, through the study of naval history.²⁴ He began this study by researching his two volume history of Drake and the Tudor Navy in 1898.²⁵ Corbett followed this with a third volume, The Successors of Drake²⁶ in 1900.

As a founding member of the Navy Records Society, Corbett became well known in the British Navy. In 1896, Sir John Laughton (The Secretary of the Navy Records Society) asked Corbett to edit "Papers Relating to the Spanish War 1585-87" and "The Naval Miscellany."²⁷ All this exposure increased Corbett's reputation and growing naval acquaintances. As a result, the British War Course invited Corbett to give a series of lectures on naval operations. These lectures eventually led him to apply history to naval strategy. This effort produced Some Principles of Maritime Strategy in 1911.²⁸

Corbett saw the impact on naval warfare resulting from steam propulsion, explosive conical shells, rifled breach loading cannons, and greatly expanded range of naval weapons. Corbett also took a Clausewitzian approach to naval warfare linking and subjugating it to national policy objectives. He did this by expanding the concept of command of the sea one step further than Mahan by adding the concept of control of the sea. He saw command of the sea as the control of maritime communications for a specific purpose. Control of the sea on the other hand, embraced the concept of having the ability for fleets to move across the sea without significant interference from the enemy.

Nations that could potentially exercise control of the sea would possess sufficient power to achieve national objectives. They did not, however, need to achieve the far harder objective of command of the sea before exercising seapower in the interest of national political objectives. These political objectives set the level of the naval effort during war. Yet, Corbett still viewed the principle objective of naval warfare to secure the command of the sea or to prevent the enemy from securing it.²⁹ But, based on political objectives and strategic circumstances a navy could adopt one or more options: command of the sea, local control of the sea, local parity, or fleet-in-being.³⁰

Corbett did not view command or control of the sea as decisive, but an integral part of the overall military operation/campaign. Seapower merely created the conditions to induce an enemy to conclude a peace. Seapower exhausted the enemy and their allies, but was slow and affected the friendly nation's and their allies' commerce. Corbett stated to achieve a quicker decision required a more drastic form of

pressure. This pressure usually translated into a land campaign supported by the navy against the enemy.³¹

Corbett's views dominated naval thinking during the early 20th century. As a result, major naval powers built fleets that could assist such land campaigns. While minor naval powers built fleets that could defend vulnerable coasts and/or engage in commerce raiding to weaken the trade of the major maritime powers. Minor powers believed that technological advances (specifically the torpedo and mine) made it possible to challenge the major maritime powers' command of the sea in territorial waters.³² In addition, minor maritime powers could use "guerre de course on the high seas"³³ to disrupt the major maritime power's sea commerce.

The U.S. Navy employed both Mahan and Corbett's theories during World War I and II. In World War I, after the British Navy achieved command of the after the battle of Jutland, the German Navy resorted to guerre de course using submarines. This forced the U.S. and British Navies into fighting the German submarines for control of the sea. During World War II the U.S. Navy achieved command and control of the sea in the Pacific, while the British Navy once again achieved command of the Atlantic. These experiences resulted in the adaption of both Mahan and Corbett's theories for use in the post World War II Cold War. The U.S. Navy planned to fight the Soviet Navy for both command and control of the sea in support of a major European land war.

Doctrinal Publications

The U.S. Navy's Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare outlines the principle of how the U.S. Navy employs naval forces.

Chapter one provides a historical review of the U.S. Navy's evolving role in national defense. It stresses the traditions of service within the U.S. Navy. It defines the character of naval service and explains the personal traits of naval service personnel. It also, stresses the key qualities of the Navy: readiness, flexibility, self sustaining, and mobility.³⁴

Chapter Two discusses the employment of naval forces. It sets out the U.S. Navy's priorities for employment: defending the U.S. and controlling its sea approaches, gaining and maintaining control of the sea and establishing our forward sea lines of communications, and power projection.³⁵ The chapter also defines the levels of war in a naval context and lays out major mission areas for the U.S. Navy: deterrence (nuclear and conventional), forward presence, operations other than war (MOOTW), sealift, joint operations, and war both at sea and from the sea.

The Navy places nuclear deterrence as its number one priority maintaining a credible, survivable, sea-based strategic deterrent through deployment of ballistic missile submarines.³⁶ Routine forward presence provides the U.S. with a conventional deterrence and suasion capability that promotes national influence and ensures access to critical global areas.³⁷ In addition, the Navy conducts MOOTW to support law enforcement agencies, civil authorities, and short duration interventions (combat operations).³⁸

Chapter Three discusses how the U.S. Navy fights during war. It outlines two styles of naval warfare: attrition and maneuver. Attrition requires the wearing down of an opponent, while maneuver

emphasizes a high tempo indirect philosophy of engaging the enemy.³⁹

The remainder of the chapter details how the U.S. Navy intends to conduct itself in war. It provides guidance on application of combat power against critical vulnerabilities and centers of gravity. In addition, the chapter discusses the importance of the commander's intent, the focus of effort and the main effort, and tempo. The last part of the chapter applies the principles of war to naval warfare.

Chapter Four provides guidance on the evolution of naval warfare and its impact on U.S. naval doctrine. This chapter introduces naval expeditionary forces. These naval expeditionary forces comprised of cohesive, self sustaining, and mobile forces provide the ability to rapidly respond to crises around the world. They provide the capability to execute critical functions such as: command, control, and surveillance, battle space dominance, power projection, and force sustainment.⁴⁰

The U.S. Army's FM 100-5, Operations describes how the U.S. Army intends to fight America's wars as part of a joint team. It begins by tying national strategy to doctrine in the first chapter. It then describes the spectrum of military operations under conditions: of peace, conflict, MOOTW, joint, and combined operations. The field manual also outlines and explains the use of the principles of war, tenants of Army operations, combat power functions, and tactical units. As its subtitle suggests, it focuses on the operational level of war. FM 100-5 provides authoritative direction for the U.S. Army and reflects its progress through the years. It remains an evolving document revised

four times in less than two decades with the latest version designed to fit the post Cold War world.

The U.S. Air Force's AF Manual 1-1 is a theory-based document that ties the strategic level of war to the tactical level. It uses Clausewitzian vignettes to define the use of aerospace power across the levels of war: strategic, operational, tactical, and operations below the level of war (the USAF's equivalent of MOOTW). It focuses on the unique nature of aerospace power to explain the application of aerospace forces. This unique nature includes the environment, the power base, and roles and missions. The manual discusses the requirements of employing aerospace power. It outlines planning responsibilities, the operational art, orchestrating aerospace roles and missions to achieve the end state, and airmindness (the airman's view of the principles of war).⁴¹

Joint Pub 1. Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces "guides the joint action of the Armed Forces of the United States."⁴² Joint Pub 1 presents the necessary guidance to mode the Armed Forces of the U.S. into the most effective fighting force on the planet. It demands that the individual services fight as a joint team by stating, "Joint warfare is essential to victory."⁴³ Its goal is to ensure the members of the U.S. Armed Forces fight together as a team. The publication defines the purpose of the U.S. Armed Forces as stated in the U.S. Constitution " . . . to provide for the common defense."

The U.S. Armed Forces accomplish this through deterrence and when that fails by winning the nation's wars. Joint Pub 1 also discusses the "long history of military support for national goals short

of war."⁴⁴ It defines the nature of modern warfare and the role of doctrine in modern warfare. In addition, it outlines personal values of joint warfare, fundamentals of joint warfare, and the campaign.

"Department of the Navy, . . . From the Sea, Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century" provides a basic vision statement for the Department of the Navy. It is also an evolutionary document with links to "the Maritime Strategy" as articulated in the last decade of the Cold War. ". . . From the Sea" published in 1992 reflects conclusions drawn from the use of naval forces during the Gulf War. In this paper the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, and Commandant of the Marine Corps outline the key doctrinal goals of the U.S. Navy for the 21st century. Naval expeditionary forces conducting operational maneuver from the sea represents the cornerstone of these doctrinal goals.

This document represents a major doctrinal shift from the maritime strategy, which originally written to fit Cold War threat assumptions. This shift parallels the doctrinal shift of the U.S. Army following the Vietnam War in 1976 and the contemporary one associated with the 1993 version of FM 100-5. The shift of focus in the Navy's case from blue water operations to the littoral area represents a major undertaking by the DON.

In 1993, the Navy modified ". . . From the Sea," with the publication of "Forward . . . From the Sea." "Forward . . . From the Sea" reaffirmed the Navy's forward presence and suasion role of the Cold War.⁴⁵ It provides guidance for the Navy's support of the NSS and the

force projection military.⁴⁶ "Forward . . . From the Sea" adapts the Navy's Cold War strategy to the post Cold War environment.

The Navy presents its "Maritime Strategy"⁴⁷ as the maritime component of the National Military Strategy during the Cold War. The maritime strategy emphasized deterrence and supporting ground campaigns both directly and indirectly on a global scale. The maritime strategy stressed stability in Third World Nations as a fundamental component of deterrence.⁴⁸ It saw the potential for direct involvement between the U.S. and Soviet Union arising from the escalation of a Third World conflict. The maritime strategy also noted that the potential lethality and destructiveness of Third World conflicts increased during the last decades as high-technology weaponry became more obtainable.

The Falklands war provided the first operational employment of such systems in a predominantly naval conflict. These advanced weapons systems operated from air, land-based, and naval (surface and submarine) platforms played a key role in the war. The success of these systems forced the U.S. Navy to prepare to encounter high technology combined arms threats in virtually every oceanic theater.

The maritime strategy contained three main parts to meet this high technology and Soviet threat: peacetime presence, crisis response, and warfighting.⁴⁹ Peacetime presence represented those routine operations throughout the world that promoted deterrence and contributed to presence and suasion in pre-crisis situations. These operations included: normal patrolling (forward presence), port visits to show U.S. interest and resolve, and combined training exercises to demonstrate friendship and support alliances.

The U.S. Navy based its crisis response on the ability to provide trained and capable forces on short notice anywhere in the world. The advantage of naval forces rested in their ability to threaten or potentially threaten an enemy without violating territorial waters or invoking basing and overflight rights of third parties. Naval forces could accomplish this mission by positioning of forces either in sight or over the horizon. In both cases, naval forces possessed the inherent capability to strike quickly with significant, if not overwhelming combat power. Besides not requiring basing rights, naval forces could stay on station indefinitely near a trouble spot. Furthermore, the over the horizon option allowed unnoticed naval forces to simply sail away (if not employed) with little damage to diplomatic relations.

The warfighting strategy encompassed an indirect approach to draw Soviet power away from Central Europe. Three phases combined to make up this warfighting component of the maritime strategy. These were: deterrence or the transition to war, seizing the initiative, and carrying the fight to the enemy.⁵⁰ Phase I deterrence or the transition to war planned to use military power early in a crisis to control escalation and deny the Soviets the option to engage in hostilities on their terms.⁵¹ Nuclear deterrence represented a distinct subset of the Navy's deterrence mission. The Navy's nuclear capable forces composed one leg of the U.S.' nuclear triad. The deterrence phase planned for the possibility of failure, thus the transition to war subtitle. The U.S. Navy's goal was to place naval forces where they could immediately influence a war should deterrence fail.

The second phase began when conflict (shots fired) opened between the U.S./NATO and the Soviet Union/WARSAW PACT. In this phase the U.S. Navy had the task of destroying Soviet naval forces in forward areas and carrying the fight toward the Soviet home waters. The phase's goal was to gain control of the seas from the Soviet Navy. The objective was to tie up the Soviet Navy in its bastions and prevent its intervention against allied Sea Line of Communications (SLOCs). A major task during this phase was antisubmarine warfare against Soviet Strategic Missile Submarines (SSBNs) and Attack Submarines (SSNs). In the first case to change the correlation of nuclear forces by conventional means and in the second to reduce the threat to allied SLOCs.

Phase III (carrying the fight to the enemy) required completion of the destruction of the Soviets fleets that began in phase II. This destruction provided the USN with command of the sea. Command of the sea allowed the U.S. Navy to influence the Soviet/WTO flanks through power projection operations.

The end result of the maritime strategy was to be the termination of a global naval struggle directed against the Soviet Union on terms favorable to the United States. It required the U.S. Navy to first achieve control of the seas followed by command of the seas. This allowed the U.S. to engage the USSR in all theaters of war.

Other Pertinent Issues/Documents

Armed Forces Staff College Publication 1, The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1993 outlines the roles and missions of the DON. The DON maintains the Navy and Marine Corps forces required to prosecute

operations in war and short of war. DON equips, trains, and organizes forces to conduct sustained joint combat operations at and from the sea.

"Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. Depuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations," Major Paul Herbert, USA, details the changing of the United States Army doctrinal base in 1976. The paper outlines the actions taken by the senior leadership of the U.S. Army to change the U.S. Army's view of warfare. General Depuy wanted the U.S. Army to develop a manual that provided a simple and direct process to help commanders win wars. General Depuy described his vision of the manual as "it is not to cover every single contingency that could happen on the battlefield, but, instead, is to make its points logically, clearly, and assertively."⁵²

Moreover, General Depuy and the U.S. Army's leadership wanted to establish a system that would allow the U.S. Army to implement change. To accomplish this, they established the U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). The Army's leadership provided TRADOC the capability to implement changes through institutional learning at all levels of training. Even with this capability, the Army realized that it takes about five years to complete the learning and implementation of change within the organization.

This resulted from the institutional school attendance cycle of Lieutenant Colonels and below. This attendance cycle required five years for at least 50% of all officers and senior Non-Commissioned Officers to attend a formal school and return to the field. These personnel in turn trained the remainder of the Army after returning to units.

In "Defense Planning for the Mystery Tour, Principles for Guidance in a Period of Nonlinear Change, 1991," Dr. Colin S. Gray a prominent defense analyst, provides insights for defense planners coping with a "defense activity that is uncertainty-pulled."⁵³ Gray wrote in the limbo period of Perestroyka when the Cold War had been de-escalated but not ended. He provided seven principles of defense planning to reduce the uncertainties faced by defense planners in such a period.⁵⁴

Michael Howard, the eminent British military historian, points out in his article "Military Science in An Age of Peace"⁵⁵ written in 1973 during an era of detente, that doctrine development is a fragile art. This art contains many competing interests that distract from the end product. These distractions increase during what he describes as "an age of peace."⁵⁶ He defines this age of peace as a period when most people do not seriously think another great war will ever occur again. This contrasts with his definition of peacetime, which merely describes the period between wars. During peacetime nations expect another war to occur and exert resources to prepare for it.

The end of the Cold War places the world into one of Howard's ages of peace. Yet, Howard notes that eras of peace do not necessarily equate to peaceful periods. He allows for increases in internal strife, revolts, and violence during ages of peace. This internalization of violence may so occupy a nation's military that the military no longer devotes the resources to maintain their main occupation. Howard describes this main occupation as preparing for another great international conflict.⁵⁷ Not only that, but the nation discourages the military from preparing for another international conflict because of

the assumption that another conflict of that scale (the kind the military exists to fight) will not occur.⁵⁸ Such was the case after World War I for the victorious entente powers.

Public apathy toward the military in such periods creates a negative environment for the military. This denies the military the civilian support (intellectual, psychological, economic, and personnel) it requires and thus reduces its efficiency.⁵⁹ It creates the potential danger that the military will "harden into an inbred, inward looking group fundamentally at odds with their surroundings."⁶⁰

More importantly an age of peace removes the classroom from the military thinker. An age of peace denies military thinkers the environment to test new ideas and technologies. Wars, unfortunately have provided military thinkers the only true laboratory to fully test new ideas and technologies. Only through actual employment in war can the military ascertain the effectiveness of new ideas and technologies. Until then, the military can only hope that their ideas and equipment will work as planned.

Howard proposes that in this type of environment everyone develops flawed doctrine. This results from the application of new and old ideas to existing paradigms of the last war. This normally/usually creates an incorrect starting point for the development of new doctrine. Howard states that under these circumstances "everyone starts even and everyone starts wrong."⁶¹

Clausewitz's concepts of the fog of war and war as a chameleon support this assumption. Clausewitz's fog (friction, uncertainty, and chance) of war makes war unpredictable because so many unknowns exist in

warfare.⁶² The fact that war is a chameleon denies military thinkers the ability to rely on conclusions drawn from past battles, because war changes its nature, bringing into play a host of factors controlled by the environment or the particular conflict. For the same reasons, military thinkers cannot with complete accuracy foresee what will happen in future battles. The longer an age of peace exists the wider the gap becomes between what once worked and what will work in warfare. For this reason Howard states that peacetime doctrine generally does not get future war right, but the process can prepare soldiers and sailors to deal with the challenge of change when combat begins.⁶³

Howard believes that whatever doctrine militaries develop during an age of peace will not work. He sees everyone starting wrong with the advantage going to the side that (1) is the least wrong, and (2) adapts the quickest to the conflict.⁶⁴ The importance of this interpretation manifests itself in the United States' military's definition of doctrine (see chapter 1 definitions). The last sentence of the definition that makes doctrine authoritative, but requires judgment in application allows the U.S. military leaders the leeway to adapt to circumstances. It also invites discussion and debate over doctrine in peacetime.

James Tritten, one of the NDC's experts of naval history and warfare recognizes the importance of doctrine in his article "Lessons and Conclusions From the History of Navy and Military Doctrinal Development."⁶⁵ His study derives three main points dealing with doctrine development resulting from lessons of history. These three main points are: naval doctrine contains formal and informal components; a fundamental difference exists between land and naval

doctrine; and doctrine serves no purpose unless it is understood and implemented by properly trained and equipped men and women.⁶⁶ Thus, Tritten explicitly recognizes the link between training and doctrine. His thesis contains additional lesser points that include: new technologies impact doctrine; doctrine cannot address all eventualities; doctrine should not become dogma; and doctrinal change is not easy in large organizations but is nonetheless vital.

Tritten's paper focuses on eight major areas of naval history to draw conclusions/lessons from history. These eight areas cover the entire spectrum of doctrine from coalition warfare to tactics, techniques, and procedures. Tritten calls these eight areas "issues" because of their inherit quality to cause debates between naval scholars. These eight areas or issues are: the principle form of attack; the object of the attack; use and size of reserves; type of war (annihilation or attrition); the relative importance of defense of the force or defeat of the enemy's offensive power; littoral warfare; command and control; and coalition warfare.⁶⁷ Tritten believes that the history of these issues provides an important foundation for doctrinal development. Tritten warns, however, that history can be bent to support any viewpoint because history is more gray than black and white. He professes the use of a middle of the road (mean) viewpoint with an understanding of the existence of extremes or exceptions to the viewpoint.⁶⁸

Tritten uses this study of history to describe and demonstrate the impact of informal doctrine on naval warfare. This informal doctrine reflects the unique nature of naval warfare of mostly

independent single ship or task force operations. He points out that commander's intent, the shared experiences of the existing officer corps, and the customs of the service from the base of informal doctrine. Nelson's "band of brothers" was the embodiment of such informal doctrine, and Trafalgar was its crowning application in the age of sail.⁶⁹ This informal doctrine (shared assumptions and experiences of a "band of brothers") continues to play a major role in USN operations because of the unique nature of naval warfare environment.

Yet, with the changes in naval warfare caused by technology, the USN recognized the need for a formal written doctrine for each naval environment: surface, air, submarine, and amphibious. The current search for a capstone naval doctrine is also supposed to encompass the changes in the strategic environment since the end of the Cold War. The USN can no longer expect to operate autonomously in the present strategic environment, in which the U.S. is the only surviving military super power and where regional powers of second rank act in a multipolar international system. The Navy must now operate as part of a joint or combined force. This requirement increases the importance of formal doctrine as the other service try to understand the capabilities that the USN brings to the fight as required by the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

A major part of understanding the capabilities of the USN rests in understanding the uniqueness of the naval environment. Tritton postulates that this uniqueness makes it difficult to translate and relate land doctrine into naval warfare. He points out that except for

a small number of choke points around the world, the naval environment does not favor the defense as does land warfare.

In fact, the naval environment favors the subsurface, surface, and airborne attacker because once detected naval forces (surface in particular) can find no cover on the open seas. This holds especially true for asymmetrical attacks against and from land based aviation. The danger here is that unless the naval force wins decisively with its first attack, it may lose decisively through a war of attrition and interior lines that favors a large land power. The replacement of ships on station is much tougher than that of divisions or air wings.

Tritten's third main point highlights the necessity of the naval profession accepting the doctrine. This involves training, equipping, practicing, and evaluating the doctrine across the spectrum of operations at all levels of command. Tritten states that "No military can operate with all, or even most, of its officers operating outside the doctrine of the profession."⁷⁰ Yet, he states given the naval environment, informal and formal doctrine, it is possible for individuals to succeed by operating outside of doctrine. He bases these exceptions on the tactical situational awareness of the officer/leader, who must still use doctrine as a departure point.⁷¹

To allow for these exceptions naval doctrine must therefore contain a certain amount of flexibility while meeting the requirements of the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. He points out that doctrine must not only meet the perceived war environment, but also consider alternatives. In this war doctrine provides a preferred

way of war, while allowing for extreme circumstances that require alternate courses of action.

Herein lies the challenge for naval doctrine writers; implementing a change to the Navy's paradigm of independent naval actions. The Navy can no longer operate independent of the other services, nor can it maintain the practice/mentality of an East and West Coast Navy. The Naval Doctrine Command represents the Navy's attempt to create an organization similar to the U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine Command to oversee doctrine development within the Naval Services (this relationship is further discussed in Chapter Three). In order to succeed the NDC must establish and implement the Navy's preferred procedures throughout the organization. This requires a study of the organization and capabilities of the NDC.

Endnotes

¹Carl von Clausewitz, On War, dited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 87.

²Ibid., 86-87.

³Ibid., 75-80.

⁴U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations, July 1993, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1993), I-2 & I-3.

⁵Willard Frank, class hand out: "The Study of War," Old Dominion University Strategy and Policy, Fall Semester, 1993 and Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, edited by Anatol Rapoport, (London, England: Penguin Books, 1982), 13-21.

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CHAPTER 3

NAVAL DOCTRINE COMMAND

On 25 September 1992, the Honorable Sean O'Keefe, Acting Secretary of the Navy directed the establishment of the Naval Doctrine Command (NDC).¹ The U.S. Navy recognized the need for an organization that dealt with the development, dissemination, and evaluation of naval doctrine. The U.S. Navy created the Naval Doctrine Command to meet this requirement.

The Secretary of the Navy Instruction gives specific guidance concerning the mission of the NDC. The NDC's primary mission makes it the U.S. Navy's authority for the development of naval concepts and integrating naval doctrine within the Naval Service. As such, the NDC serves as the coordinating authority for Naval Service unique doctrine. In addition, the NDC represents the U.S. Navy in the development of joint and combined doctrine. Finally, the NDC ensures that operations, training, exercises, wargames, and education reflects current naval doctrine.

NDC Organization

The NDC Commander alternates between a USN Rear Admiral (RADM) (upper grade/08) and a U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) Major General. The Deputy Commander is either a USN Captain or a USMC Colonel alternating on the opposite cycle than the commander. So, if the NDC

Commander is a USN RADM, the Deputy Commander is a USMC Colonel or vice versa. The U.S. Navy authorizes the NDC a total personnel strength of 52 (officers [active duty and reserve], enlisted, and civilians). These 52 personnel comprise five major divisions/departments within the NDC. These divisions/departments are: headquarters, strategy and concepts, naval doctrine development, joint and combined doctrine, and evaluation.

The strategy and concepts division evaluates the impact of National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, new strategic concepts, national defense policy and contingency planning on naval combat capabilities.² To accomplish this, the strategy and concepts division prepares, revises, updates, and disseminates strategic fleet operational concepts to the U.S. Navy. The division coordinates studies of strategic warfare with the Fleets, Navy and Marine Corps centers of strategic excellence, and the Naval War College. In addition, the division serves as the central point of contact for global wargaming.

The naval doctrine division coordinates the development of Navy and naval doctrine with U.S. naval warfighting centers to address the operational level of warfare.³ It is also responsible for developing the link between operational and tactical levels of war in naval doctrinal publications. Another of the doctrine division's major tasks is the development of littoral and expeditionary warfare doctrine. In addition, the doctrine division maintains the Naval Warfare Publication Library.

The joint and combined doctrine division provides a coordinated USN/USMC input into the development of air/land/sea/space joint and combined doctrine.⁴ To accomplish this requires establishing liaison

with operators at fleet level, the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), the U.S. Army's TRADOC, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) Air Combat Command (ACC), the Joint Doctrine Center, and the Joint Warfare Center. The division is responsible for ensuring that Navy doctrine is consistent with approved joint doctrine. The division also represents the USN on the Joint Doctrine Working Party, NATO Working Parties, Air Standardization Coordination Committee, and the Military Agency for Standardization in Brussels.

The evaluation, training, and education division ensures the integration of Navy, joint, and combined doctrine into training and educational systems within the USN. It assesses the validity of current doctrine during wargames and exercises. This allows the division to ensure current doctrine is consistent with current naval operations and vice versa. The division is responsible for the compilation, evaluation, and dissemination of lessons learned from exercises, training, operations, conflict, and war.

NDC Priorities

The NDC's top ten priorities in 1993 were (capstone publications on: Naval Expeditionary Force (NEF) commander concept, joint doctrine development, naval doctrine education and training, littoral warfare, combined forces' operational doctrine, command, control, communications, computers and intelligence, naval warfare publication system, and modeling and simulation.)⁵ These priorities came from the NDC's charter and the input of the Fleet Commanders.

USN Doctrine Center

A major deficiency of the USN's doctrine development rests in the decentralization of the Navy's doctrine system. This reflects past experiences and institutional organization. The organizations that compose the doctrine centers of excellence include: the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), the Surface Warfare Development Group (SWDG), Submarine Development Squadron 12 (SUBDEVRON 12), and the Operational Test Evaluation Force (OPTEVFOR). These organizations work for/report to numerous commanders, either Fleet or Type Commanders, or the Commandant of the Marine Corps. In addition, the training and education function of the USN falls under the control of the Chief of Naval Education, who reports directly to the Chief of Naval Operations.

These doctrine centers of excellence develop and publish (with inputs from their respective commanders/communities) the Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Department of the Navy. One of the NDC's goals for the Naval Warfare Publication System encompasses a revision of the centers of excellence to erase artificial division's resulting from these warfare communities (surface, submarine, air, and marine). For example, under the current system SWDG develops and disseminates class tactical manuals for each class of surface combatants as a separate entity, not as part of a task force or force package. NDC's goal is to publish Navy wide Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures that synchronize weapons systems using the composite warfare commander concept.

The current command structure of these centers of excellence presents a serious challenge to the NDC's plan. None of the doctrine

centers of excellence fall under the command of the NDC. The Commander of MCCDC reports directly to the Marine Corps Commandant. The Commander SWDG reports to the Commander Naval Surface Forces, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. The Commander SUBDEVRON 12 reports to the Commander, Submarine Forces, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. The Commander OPTEVFOR reports to the Navy Staff (Operational Test & Evaluation Directory). The NDC conducts liaison with these centers and can task them on a limited basis for certain doctrinal issues.⁶

This command relationship restricts the NDC'S ability to influence the doctrine centers of excellence and effect changes to the Navy's doctrine system. In this command structure the Chief of Naval Operations represents the first level that can effect doctrinal change throughout the Navy. The limitations of the Navy's doctrinal system are best understood by contrasting them with the U.S. Army's approach to doctrine.

The U.S. Army's Experience

The reduction in U.S. military involvement in the Vietnam War in the early 1970's brought a drawdown of the U.S. Army. Army planners saw the opportunity to reorganize the Continental Army Command (CONARC) during this drawdown. In 1972, the Army established the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) to replace CONARC. TRADOC assumed control of all the Army's schools and training centers (except the U.S. Army War College and the U.S. Military Academy). FORSCOM representing the operational component took command of all Army operational units based within the United States.⁷

TRADOC received responsibility for the development and dissemination of doctrine because doctrine represented the guiding principles of training. In addition, the Army assigned the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command to TRADOC. The Combat Developments Command conducted research of new technologies and techniques of land warfare. By doing this, the Army consolidated doctrine development, soldier training, and the research into the application of new technologies and techniques under one command: TRADOC. This gave TRADOC the ability to change the way the Army thought about and prepared for war.⁸

This organizational structure resulted from the assessment of General (GEN) William E. Depuy, who both oversaw TRADOC's conception and became its first commander. He viewed reorganization of the Army's training system as the key to changing the Army's attitude toward war. GEN Depuy realized that TRADOC required oversight of training, doctrine development (writing), and combat developments to accomplish this change. So, establishment of TRADOC became GEN Depuy's first priority.⁹

Three months into this reorganization an Arab-Israeli War erupted on October 6, 1973. The Yom Kippur (October) War represented a conventional war between modern armies equipped with mostly first line U.S. and Soviet equipment. The U.S. Army eventually used this conflict as the basis for development of their new doctrine. One of the lessons the October War provided the U.S. Army dealt with the lethality of the modern battlefield. This lethality resulted from the combination of new weapon systems and new tactics (combined arms and joint).

The Army began to brief the results of their study of the October War in early 1975. These results showed that the U.S. Army

lacked the capability in both equipment and tactics to fight a similar war. The Army recognized the need to address shortcomings in equipment, tactics, and psyche. To overcome these shortcomings involved making changes at every organizational level in the Army. The Army gave this task to TRADOC, which "embarked on a program to reorient and restructure the whole body of Army doctrine from top to bottom."¹⁰

TRADOC produced the 1976 edition of FM 100-5, Operations to meet this tasking. Once the major Army Field Commanders accepted the new doctrine contained in the manual, TRADOC began implementation. This implementation entailed a myriad of tasks programmed over an extended period (years). GEN Depuy and the Army's leadership knew that it would take time to complete their planned transformation.¹¹

TRADOC began teaching the new doctrine in Army schools to change the Army's psyche and tactics. "Fight out numbered and win" became the Army's strategic statement. TRADOC required the proponents of lower level manuals (branch schools) to rewrite branch tactical manuals to reflect FM 100-5's doctrine. More importantly, TRADOC focused the research, development, and acquisition efforts of the Army toward a mechanized European War. The needs of the new doctrine drove the modernization of the Army.¹²

In 1976, the Army changed its approach to fighting wars. It did this by creating the right organization (TRADOC), learning from history, and implementing the required changes. In TRADOC the Army established a system with the capability to implement, assess and update doctrine. Doctrine designed as a living document not dogma, allowing for improvements resulting from feedback from operational units. Since

1976, the Army (TRADOC) completed and implemented major rewrites of FM 100-5, Operations in 1982, 1986, and 1993. TRADOC's system allowed the Army to accomplish this difficult task.

Implications for the Navy

TRADOC represents the Army's centralized organization specifically designed to oversee all the components of doctrine. The Army views TRADOC'S mission important enough to make it a four star command. This mission includes individual institutional training from recruit to Lieutenant-Colonel, doctrine, and selection of equipment. In addition, TRADOC controls special Combat Training Centers (CTCs) to evaluate the status of training in the Army. These CTCs play an important role in the accomplishment of TRADOC's mission.

TRADOC assesses Army training at these Combat Training Centers. These assessments provide feedback concerning individual and collective training and the effectiveness of doctrine. The CTCs look to discover systemic problems with training and/or doctrine. TRADOC uses the results of these assessments to correct training and doctrine shortcomings at the institutional knowledge level.

TRADOC represents a successful military command capable of instituting changes of doctrine and training within a military organization. It reflects the Army's systematic approach to warfighting. In TRADOC, the Army gives one organization responsibility and authority for the doctrine system: writing, implementation, evaluation, and force structure. It serves as a model for comparisons of other doctrine organizations.

The NDC writes the higher level (operational and strategic) doctrine for the Navy. It eventually will supervise or coordinate most lower level (TTP) doctrine within the Navy. However, NDC does not supervise the development of Marine Corps doctrine. So, currently the NDC can write new doctrine, but does not possess the capability to disseminate the doctrine into all naval publications. The "Type" Commanders (surface, submarine, and aviation) and the Marine Corps Combat Development Command retain responsibility and authority for writing and updating TTP manuals.

The evaluation of doctrine follows the same chain of command. Type Commanders conduct and supervise individual and crew training and logistics for the operational commanders (Numbered Fleets). The U.S. based Numbered Fleet Commanders complete battle group and task group training. Feedback from these work-ups goes back to the Type Commands for resolution. This hinders the sharing of training successes and failures within the Navy.

As for Combat Developments, the Navy Staff makes most of the equipment decisions within the Navy. The Navy Staff asks for and receives inputs from the fleet (normally type commands), but this process focuses on capabilities more than total system integrations (weapon system plus tactics). The situation carries with it the possibility of acquiring a weapon system that does not meet the needs of the Navy.

The NDC operates more like the Joint Doctrine Center (now part of the Joint Warfighting Center) than TRADOC. The Joint Doctrine Center's (JDC) mission differs from that of TRADOC. The JDC coordinates

the writing of joint doctrine by the Services and Unified Commands. The JDC writes only a small percentage of joint doctrine. Most joint doctrine is written by a "lead agent" Service or Unified CINC (based on preponderance of impact) designated by the JDC. Once the lead agent completes a draft, the JDC distributes it for review by other Services and Unified Commands. JDC serves as the mediator to get a consensus on joint doctrine within the military. After joint doctrine receives approval, it becomes the responsibility of the Unified CINC's to implement the doctrine born out of a weak Joint Staff trying to assert leadership in an area.

The Historical Study

The Army used the Yom Kippur (October) War to change from a theater driven low intensity combat Army to a European centered mechanized Army. The Army's force structure in 1975 (after the Army withdrew from Vietnam) consisted of six heavy (mechanized) divisions, four heavy brigades, nine light (non-mechanized) divisions and three light brigades.¹³ The lessons from the Yom Kippur War showed the U.S. Army the requirements needed to fight a modern mechanized war. The 1976 version of FM 100-5 shifted the psyche of the Army out of the jungles of Vietnam and on to the fields of Central Europe. As a result, the Army quickly discovered better ways to fight a European war and revised FM 100-5 accordingly. GEN Depuy built this capability into the system when he helped establish TRADOC.

As the Navy moves away from the Cold War global naval battle found in the maritime strategy to a new maritime strategy. The question remains, what role will Navy play in the next war? A study of the

Falklands Island War (1982) provides some possible roles for future naval combat involving the U.S. Navy. The Gulf War can also provide additional possibilities and lessons learned, but to a lesser degree.

The 1982 Falklands War required the British Navy to act in a force projection role. During the war, the British expeditionary force fought Argentine naval, air, and land forces equipped with modern weapons. In doing so, British forces conducted forcible entry operations using power projected from the sea. In the battle for control of the sea, the British lost two destroyers (Sheffield, Coventry), two frigates (Ardent, Antelope), a landing ship (Sir Galahad), and a container ship (Atlantic Conveyor) while 11 more ships received damage.¹⁴

The Falklands War exhibited many of the current U.S. Navy views toward war. A naval expeditionary force conducted the operation in a littoral region. The War required the naval force to project and sustain power ashore. While British Naval Forces destroyed Argentine Naval Forces (Belgrano)¹⁵ in the area to achieve command of the sea. Most important, the British Navy fought an asymmetrical battle against the Argentine Armed Forces (predominantly Air Force) for control of the sea.

The Gulf War displayed the same type of naval operation as the Falklands War. Naval expeditionary forces played a key role in the U.S. Central Command's campaign plan. Naval operations occurred in the littoral regions of the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, and Mediterranean Sea. The Navy projected significant power ashore in the form of Marine air and ground forces, naval aviation, and naval gunfire. The Navy

destroyed the Iraqi Navy to achieve command of the sea early in the conflict. Iraq then resorted to the use of mines and anti-ship missiles (asymmetrical operations) to deny the U.S. Navy control of the sea.

These conflicts represent the most likely naval battles of the future. Battles fought to achieve regional control and command of the sea against enemy land, air, and naval forces. These battles will most likely depend on asymmetrical engagements occurring in littoral regions to gain control of the sea. This will require ships and naval forces projecting power ashore to defend themselves against attacks that might include aviation, anti-ship missiles, mines, and shore batteries.

Summary

TRADOC's example shows what areas doctrine organizations must address (doctrine development (writing) and implementation, force structure, and evaluation (including the use of history)) to succeed. The Navy needs to evaluate their NDC to determine if it meets the Navy's needs. If the NDC does not meet the Navy's needs, why? Finally, what steps do the Navy take to address problems with the NDC.

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CHAPTER FOUR

ANALYSIS

Introduction

Chapter 2 explains how the U.S. uses the rational model of war as the criteria for selecting its basic theory/theorist. This theorist is currently Carl von Clausewitz. Clausewitz's theories represent the foundation of U.S. military doctrine. The U.S. Army's Command and General Staff College Combat Studies Institute uses the following model to explain the relationship between theory and doctrine:




Figure 1.

This rational view of war produces the definition of strategy contained in the U.S. Army's FM 100-5, Operations: "the art and science of employing the armed forces and other elements of national power during peace, conflict, and war to secure national security objectives."¹ This strategy requires the use and coordination of all four instruments of national power (military, economic, diplomatic, and information) to obtain national security objectives.² This reinforces

the link between national strategy and military strategy. This linkage requires the military to understand the application of the other three instruments of national power.

Theory serves as the start point for building a model of war that provides the basis for the analysis of the subject. The model begins at theory and ends in and the evaluation/feedback stage. Adding the steps that connect these two ends produces a process to develop doctrine, in this case, doctrine for the U.S. Navy. Once again, it is important to note that the intent of this study is not to produce actual doctrine but to examine a methodology for the development of doctrine.

The NSS provides the start point for doctrine development based on the rational model of war. The U.S. military's Joint Staff takes the NSS and publishes a military specific strategy. This National Military Strategy (NMS) serves to bridge the gap between the NSS and military operations/doctrine. Figure 2 below represents a modified rudimentary version of the model of war.




Figure 2.

This model outlines the minimum requirements of developing doctrine. It highlights the strategic implications of doctrine development within the United States.

This model requires that both the political and military leadership understand the strategic implications of their decision concerning war. It places responsibility on both to understand and mobilize the five sources of national power (geography, population,

economy, national will, and national direction)³ to achieve national goals and objectives. It assumes they possess the ability to channel that national power into the instruments of national power to successfully respond to a crisis. In this process, the military leadership must play the part of honest broker to ensure conditions warrant the use of military forces. This further modifies the model to look like this:




Figure 3.

Using the military instrument of power requires additional development of the model. The Department of Defense takes the NSS and adapts it to specific military tasks. This results in the publication of the National Military Strategy (NMS). The NMS provides the basis for preparing and selecting military courses of actions. This process creates an alignment between national security and national military goals and objectives. Up to this point, the model applies to all the services equally. After the Joint Staff develops the NMS segment, each service develops its own corresponding service specific missions based on the requirements of the NMS and DOD guidance.

Service specific missions cause yet another modification of the model. These missions of the individual services bridge the gap between

the NMS and doctrine. In this case, the Department of Defense (DOD) tasks the U.S. Navy for preparing Navy and Marine Corps Forces necessary for the effective prosecution of military operations to achieve national objectives. DOD Directive 5101.1 directs the Department of the Navy (DON) to perform certain functions in order to meet this mission. Some of the key DOD Directive 5101.1 tasks for the U.S. Navy include:⁴

- a. Organize, train, equip, and furnish Navy and Marine Corps Forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea.
- b. Organize, train, equip, and provide forces for strategic nuclear warfare to support strategic deterrence.
- c. Organize, equip, and furnish naval forces including naval close air support and space forces for the conduct of joint amphibious operations.
- d. Furnish the afloat forces for strategic sealift.

Inserting these missions modifies the model of war to look like this:




Figure 4.

At this point, the model still reflects doctrine involving only single service operations in an environment of war.

Yet, this single service view of war while bureaucratically rationale, no longer fits the reality of U.S. military operations. Currently U.S. military operations emphasize joint operations. The

Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 codified this joint requirement into law. Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces complied with this requirement by providing guidance, emphasis, and a framework for joint operations. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reinforced the importance of jointness in his July 1994 memorandum that made joint doctrine "authoritative except in extreme circumstances."⁵ The inclusion of joint operations necessitates another modification to the model of war. This new addition modifies the model to this:




Figure 5.

The next step in developing this model requires adding feedback channels that include both formal and informal feedback. The informal channel occurs throughout the model as positive and negative feedback resulting from experiences and lessons learned. The model keys on the informal feedback originating from pseudo war. This is because pseudo war represents the test of doctrine in exercises and/or simulations. Two formal feedback channels exist in this model: descriptive and prescriptive.

The descriptive path focuses on the continuum of war and peace. It involves the study of cause and effect relationships in wars. The

prescriptive path deals with the possible courses of actions that arise during war. It relies heavily on the study of past wars and fundamental rules of warfare to prescribe possible situations that may arise during war. The addition of these feedback channels makes the model look like this:




Figure 6.

The last step requires adding the feedback channels from the original Combat Studies Institute's model. While emerging technology does not truly represent feedback, it significantly affects doctrine development by overcoming or causing constraints on operations. The "pseudo-war" channel serves as a peacetime test bed for technology and doctrine. Pseudo-war entails the use of exercises, simulations, and

evaluations to prepare units for military operations. The value of the pseudo-war channel becomes more important as war games increasingly reflect actual combat. The final version of the model of war is displayed below:




Figure 7.

This model represents a very complex view of war. A change at any step can significantly change the end product by accumulating changes at successive steps.⁶ The complexity of the system also leads to a self reinforcing mechanism⁷ that opposes change. To successfully use the model requires understanding that the system represent a continual process producing/requiring periodical updates (revisions) of the product.

Analysis

Theory represents the first step because it defines the strategic environment that the U.S. military operates within. This strategic environment starts with the fundamental principle of this nation that places the military under civilian control. It puts severe restrictions on the employment of U.S. military forces both at home and abroad. The military oath of service codifies this fundamental principle of military service. In addition, this oath that each member of the U.S. Armed Forces takes upon entering the services provides the fundamental purpose (strategic mission) of the military. The U.S. Armed Forces exist first and foremost to support and defend the Constitution of the United States. This defensive mission includes deterring and preventing direct attack against the U.S. and/or its territories.

So, the first step in doctrine development must explain the relationship between the strategic mission and U.S. Navy theory. This fundamental purpose (strategic mission) means the Navy must defend the U.S. during periods of war from attack originating from the world's oceans and seas. To accomplish this requires defeating the enemy's means to strike the United States from those oceans and seas. The U.S. Navy uses two theories to define how it will accomplish this mission: Mahan's "Command of the Sea"⁸ or Corbett's "Control of the Sea."⁹ The strategic environment (national goals and objectives, enemy, location) determines, if the Navy needs to drive the enemy from the sea (command of the sea) or ensure friendly use of the sea at a particular place and time (control of the sea). This includes the U.S. Navy's role in

deterring potential enemies by possessing the capability to achieve one of these theoretical end states.

After defining the fundamental purpose of the Navy and its impact on Naval theory, the next step requires understanding the impact of general security theory on U.S. National Security Policy. Theory provides the conditions of employment and the mission of the U.S. military. The current strategic theorist that permeates U.S. strategic thought is Carl Von Clausewitz. American leaders embrace Clausewitz's maxims that "war is merely the continuation of policy by other means"¹⁰ and "all wars can be considered acts of policy."¹¹ The National Security Strategy of the United States reflects this school of thought by demonstrating that military power represents only one of the four instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, economic, and military). Moreover, the U.S. usually uses its military as a last resort after employing one or all of the other instruments of national power.

This trait provides early warning and guidance for possible military involvement in a crisis. U.S. strategic planners use this time to define the strategic environment of the particular crisis for the military. In this way, U.S. strategy defines what conditions the Navy needs to achieve command or control of the sea. Strategic theory also sets the foundation for the National Security Strategy of the United States.

The National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS) details/tasks what the political leadership expects from its four instruments of national power. All of the three main security goals of

the 1994 NSS impact the strategic direction of the U.S. military. This impact ties into doctrine through the National Military Strategy (NMS) which provides the "how to" guidance to implement the NSS. The NMS translates the NSS into military objectives.

The February 1995 NMS reinforces the taskings of the NSS and serves as the basis for the next step: development of service missions. To serve as the United States' dominate Naval Force represents the basic role of the U.S. Navy. Its basic mission corresponds to the Navy's fundamental purpose: defend the U.S. and its territories from attack from the world's oceans and seas. The NMS adds deterrence; credible overseas presence; the ability to fight (with regional allies) two nearly simultaneous Major Regional Conflicts (MRC); contributing to multilateral peace operations, supporting counter terrorism, and supporting other national security objectives to the Navy's basic mission.

The roles and missions given to the Navy serve to define its existence by providing the Navy with its requirements. Roles and missions serve as the strategic ways for service doctrine. Service doctrine creates naval ways and means designed to achieve these strategic ways. Requirements of these naval ways and means allow the Navy to qualify resources needed to meet these requirements. These resource needs drive the establishment of equipment, personnel, and infrastructure requirements for these ways and means. For example, strategic nuclear deterrence requires (at a minimum) nuclear ballistic submarines, attack submarines, anti-submarine aircraft, command and communication systems (Extreme Low Frequency [ELF], Take Charge and Move

Out [TACAMO] aircraft), crews, and bases. The Navy must possess the capability plus the ability to counter/attack the enemy's similar capability. Once the Navy possess the capability, it must codify these ways and means to describe how the Navy employs forces to achieve desired results. These codified ways and means translate into doctrine.

Doctrine represents a conceptual understanding within the service on fundamental principles that guide the employment of naval forces. It includes both a formal written component that includes guidance on tactics, techniques, and procedures and an informal component that includes such items as customs, local instructions, and commander's intent.¹² Doctrine addresses situations or provides guidance across the entire spectrum of military operations (strategic to operations other than war). It also, plays an important part in the joint warfighting ability of the Nation's Armed Forces.

Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces dated November 1991 states that "The nature of modern warfare demands that we fight as a team."¹³ As a result the U.S. military can no longer think in terms of single service operations. The July 1994, CJCS Memorandum that makes joint doctrine authoritative adds jointness as an intrinsic component of doctrine. This merely reinforces the reality of current U.S. military operations, which seldom rely on single service operations. Current U.S. concepts of modern warfare demand that the services fight as a team. This concept does not reduce the role of the services, but rather increases their responsibilities to provide capable and flexible forces able to perform as a member of a joint team.

Joint doctrine addresses this requirement to perform as member of a joint team. It provides the fundamental basis of how to employ U.S. military power to achieve strategic ends. Joint doctrine currently in its infancy grows more developed each day through a joint effort of the Joint Staff, services, and Combatant Commands. Joint doctrine with its associated Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) establishes the common start point (baseline) concerning U.S. military operations. It defines the way the U.S. plans and trains for war.

Joint doctrine in accordance with the CJCS's 1994 guidance represents the driving force of service doctrine. Joint doctrine becomes the strategic level ways to achieve national objectives. The DOD (Joint Pub 1-02) definition of doctrine ". . . actions in support of national objectives"¹⁴ supports this relationship.

Service doctrine in essence becomes a sub-component of joint doctrine that under certain conditions can stand alone (single service operations). This reflects the relationship of service operations within the context of a campaign plan. Successful joint warfighting requires each service to possess formal written doctrine that the other services can readily understand. In this model, service doctrine becomes more of an operational level ways and means to achieve national objectives.

LCDR Knox's 1915 definition of doctrine fits this operational focus of the services. Service doctrine promotes "the prompt and harmonious conduct by the subordinate commanders of a large military force . . . without referring each decision to superior authority. . . ."¹⁵ Service doctrine applies the military force of the

service to achieve specific objectives of the higher commander. The Combatant Commanders (Unified Commander in Chiefs) represent the higher commander for service operations. Combatant Commanders assign missions to their subordinate service component commanders that achieve their military objectives.

To meet the needs of the Combatant Commanders, service doctrine must address the entire spectrum of conflict¹⁶ from peacetime to strategic nuclear war. As such, it must begin in general terms and progress to specific tactics, techniques, and procedures that form the operational foundation of the service. Service doctrine provides a conceptual view on how the service fights, while allowing sufficient flexibility to adjust to the uncertainties of war.¹⁷ Doctrine requires this because it cannot address all the possibilities of war. Eventually, the commander will need to use his (her) "innate talent and genius to operate outside the rules because theory often conflicts with practice."¹⁸

Doctrine becomes the focal point of the fundamental mission of the service, the spectrum of conflict, and service capabilities. The mission and spectrum of conflict give general guidance while capabilities translate into TTPs. The fundamental mission: defense of the United States, implies deterrence of direct action against the U.S. and requires the defeat of opponents (worst case strategic nuclear war). The spectrum of conflict addresses different level of force application between the two extremes (deterrence and strategic nuclear war).

The spectrum of conflict sets the conditions under which naval doctrine functions. Deterrence requires the Navy to operate credible

forces in a visible manner around the globe. Strategic deterrence provides the rationale for the Navy's nuclear submarine and long range power projection forces. Operational deterrence requires the Navy to conduct such missions as freedom of navigation, port visits, forward presence, and multinational training exercises. Tactical deterrence missions include: port visits, daily training, forward presence, and multinational training exercises. Deterrence encompasses all those operations that fall under "showing the Flag" or shows of force.

The next level of conflict entails dealing with operations from crisis response through major regional conflict. These operations deal with the application of forces in a hostile environment. Crisis response uses operations such as a noncombatant evacuation (NEO), strikes, raids, and enforcement of embargoes through blockades or inspections to resolve crises. Naval actions in support of a major regional conflict require the Navy to achieve as a minimum local control of the seas.

The final level of conflict (war) involves the U.S. Navy gaining command of the seas. Global conventional war although unlikely in the near future requires the Navy to drive opposing naval forces from the sea. Theater nuclear or conventional war requires regional command of the sea to remove the enemy's ability to strike friendly forces from naval platforms. In a strategic nuclear war, the Navy must remove the enemy's strike capability from the sea, while maintaining its ability to conduct nuclear attacks from the sea.

How the Navy conceptualizes these operations translates into a basic doctrinal statement. This statement becomes the "Air-Land

Battle"¹⁹ equivalent of the Navy. In the past the Navy called this statement the "Maritime Strategy"²⁰ and ". . . From the Sea."²¹ Whatever the Navy calls this doctrine statement, it must be both formal and authoritative. This doctrine statement conceptualizes how the Navy fights. As such, it should dominate the contents of NDP-3 Operations.

The next step develops the methodology to meet the doctrinal statement. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) comprise the bulk of this methodology. The Army uses combat functions (intelligence, maneuver, fire support, air defense, mobility and survivability, logistics, and battle command) and offensive and defensive operations to establish the framework for meeting the concepts of their Air-Land Battle. The Navy uses warfare communities as its methodology for conducting naval warfare.

The Navy's fleet and task force commanders divide the naval battlespace along environmental lines under a Composite Warfare Commander (CWC). The CWC allows the Officer in Tactical Command (OTC) to aggressively wage combat operations to accomplish/achieve the force's mission/objectives. The CWC supervises the following warfare commanders: antisubmarine, antiair, antisurface, strike, and space and electronic. These warfare commanders' responsibilities entail dominating their particular portion of the Task Force's battle space. This includes the use of both offensive and defensive operations. In addition, the CWC controls the actions of the air resources element coordinator, the helicopter element coordinator, the submarine coordinator, the maneuvering coordinator, and the screen commander.

The CWC concept focuses on single service (naval) operations. In this role, the concept meets the needs of the Navy. It, however, lacks applicability to joint operations. To meet joint requirements, the Navy must address the concept of service synchronization found in the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) Pub 2.²²

AFSC Pub 2 lists three components of service synchronization: symmetrical, mutual supporting and asymmetrical relationships. Symmetrical engagements represent the most undesirable relationship in modern warfighting. They rely on fighting against a similar force (naval vs naval). This type of engagement often becomes one of friendly brute force and numbers against enemy brute force and numbers. Unlike, mutual supporting operations that entail coordination to fight a multi-service force against a single service force (land and naval vs. naval). They require detailed coordination and an understanding of the other services capabilities and doctrine. Asymmetrical engagements represent the most desirable relationship in modern warfighting. In these engagements, commanders leverage their strengths against their enemy's weaknesses.

The requirements of symmetrical, asymmetrical, and mutual support relationships directly task the Navy's power projection capabilities. To succeed requires a thorough understanding of the capabilities and doctrine of each service. Doctrine plays the key role in the ability of commanders to achieve maximum synergism of assigned forces. However, Armed Forces Staff College Pub 2 points out that all the services fail to articulate their needs and capabilities in their service doctrine.²³

When the Navy successfully reaches this point, it possesses a workable doctrine. It can add items as such as principles of war, tenets of operations, battle space organization, and historical examples as its leadership sees necessary for the overall product. More importantly, the Navy now must implement the doctrine within the service and export it to the other services. Chapter three discusses the system for implementation, so the concern now focuses on application.

Application deals not only with the actual use of doctrine in real world situations, but the process of obtaining, maintaining, and assessing the capability to use the doctrine. This later element of application results in the first feed back channel for doctrine development. This feedback occurs during pseudo war (joint and fleet exercises, deployment work-ups, and normal training). Lessons from these events provide the peacetime validation of doctrine and/or exposes its weaknesses.

The Navy must create a system that reviews and modifies its doctrine, if the Navy expects to possess a successful doctrine. Pseudo-war evaluates the peacetime component of the spectrum of conflict (training, forward presence, and deterrence). The ability to correct weaknesses that surface during pseudo-war helps doctrine meet Michael Howard's thesis of "getting it nearly right"²⁴ before the next war. It requires some means to assess the doctrine system. This evaluation organization must possess the capability to input changes to doctrine by modifying the NMS/roles, mission, joint doctrine, or doctrine functions of the model.

The real test of doctrine comes from actual application in a crisis situation. The areas that fall between the crisis response and the strategic nuclear war components of the spectrum of conflict represent a crisis situation. Actual crises involving naval forces will expose both strengths and weaknesses in the Navy's doctrine. This occurs regardless of the outcome of the crisis or the level of involvement. The Navy's performance and participation during a crisis by either threatening or using force must play a part in the evaluation of doctrine.

The results of this evaluation provide feedback on a greater scale than pseudo-war. Crisis resolution involves all the instruments of national power, so the evaluation occurs to a greater and broader degree. The descriptive and prescriptive study of a crisis resolution affects the model of war across all its components starting with theory. At the same time, an evaluation (lessons learned) of naval performance provides feedback to the military component of the model (NMS/roles, mission, joint doctrine, and doctrine). Any of the three evaluations can result in an eventual change to doctrine.

Emerging technology represents the final feedback mechanism of doctrine development. The emerging technology component of the model possesses the unique trait of receiving stimulus from both internal and external factors. The internal stimulus comes from the other components of the model producing requirements for new equipment (technologies). The external stimulus results from nonmilitary scientific/technological advances that produce improvements applicable to military forces. Emerging technology represents the most dynamic component of the model.

Endnotes

¹U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations, July 1993, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1993), Glossary-8.

²Ted Davis, "Concepts of National Security and Elements of National Power," Joint and Combined Environments (C510), (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Aug 1994), 21, and Department of Defense, Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 11 Nov 91), 39.

³Ibid.

⁴Department of Defense, Armed Forces Staff College Publication 1, The Joint Staff Officer's Guide, 1993, (Norfolk, VA: The Armed Forces Staff College, 1993), 1-3.

⁵Memorandum from the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Subject: Joint Doctrine, (Washington, DC: 28 July 1994).

⁶W. Brian Arthur, "Positive Feedbacks in the Economy," Scientific American, (New York, NY: Scientific American Inc., Feb 1990), 94.

⁷Ibid., 95.

⁸Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Seapower Upon History, (New York, NY: Hill and Wang, 1957).

⁹Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988).

¹⁰Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 87.

¹¹Ibid., 88.

¹²James J. Tritten, "Lessons and Conclusions From the History of Navy and Military Doctrinal Development," 2-5.

¹³Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 11 November 1991), iii.

¹⁴Department of Defense, Joint Pub 1-02, Definitions and Terms, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1989).

¹⁵Dudley W. Knox, "The Role of Doctrine in Naval Warfare," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, March-April 1915), 334.

¹⁶Admiral James D. Watkins, USN, "The Maritime Strategy," The Maritime Strategy, (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, Jan 1986), B-6.

¹⁷Clausewitz, On War, 84-85.

¹⁸Ibid., 140.

¹⁹Concept on how the U.S. Army would fight its next war first introduced in FM 100-5 (1976), but defined in the 1982 version of FM 100-5.

²⁰Admiral James D. Watkins named his strategy for global naval war against the Soviet Union, The Maritime Strategy, in his article "The Maritime Strategy," The Maritime Strategy, (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, Jan 1986).

²¹Sean O'Keefe, Secretary of the Navy, redirected the efforts of the Navy in his White Paper, "...From the Sea, Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century," (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, Sep 1992).

²²Department of Defense, AFSC Pub 2, Chapter 4 discusses the concept of symmetrical, asymmetrical, and mutual supporting relationships of military power, (Norfolk, VA: The Armed Forces Staff College, 1992).

²³AFSC Pub 2, II-4-3.

²⁴Michael Howard, "Military Science in An Age of Peace," Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, vol 119, March 1974, reprinted at CGSC by special permission, 4-5.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

Chapter four provides a systematic approach to the development of U.S. naval doctrine. It makes use of a model of war resulting from chapter two's literature review. Chapter four's system represents only one of many possible methods of doctrine development. The question remains, does this method help answer the thesis question by providing a methodology that will aid the USN in developing naval doctrine for the 21st century?

This methodology requires making an assumption concerning the validity of chapter two's model of war, an assumption that the model correctly describes the process of conceptualizing war. This assumption allows the model to provide a generic systematic approach to develop doctrine: a methodology. It involves extracting components from the analysis phase to establish this methodology.

The components of this methodology start at theory and end at the evaluation phase. These components establish the minimum items of the methodology. Likewise, the discussion of these components does not fix a set order for developing doctrine. It presents a listing of component topics needed for the methodology without reference to grouping or specific order. The following list represents these components selected from the analysis in chapter four: Theory,

strategic environment, the role of doctrine, the Navy's role and purpose in the strategic environment, history of the Navy, strategic statement, joint warfighting, warfare communities, force projection, Operations Other Than War (OOTW), sustainment, guiding principles or tenets, and evaluation.

Theory provides the start point of this methodology. It provides insights and defines how the U.S. views and wages war. It explains the components of national power and the relationship between national power and crisis response. Theory outlines what the U.S. expects from its military and gives the military its overall purpose for existence. Theory lays the foundation for the strategic environment.

Defining the strategic environment requires translating theory into military terms. The strategic environment discusses the levels of war (strategic, operational, and tactical) based on the consequences of the outcomes of each level. It includes a discussion concerning the role that the National Military Strategy plays in military operations. In addition, the component needs to address strategic decision making (the importance of strategic objectives) and the need for a clear strategic end state. The strategic environment coordinates the efforts of the political policy makers (National Command Authority), the senior leadership of the Navy and the instruments of national power.

The next component concerns the role of doctrine in this process. Doctrine provides the link between theory, the strategic environment, and naval operations. Doctrine allows for the successful conduct of military operations with the least amount of coordination and

confusion. Doctrine represents the play book of military operations for the Navy.

Doctrine must discuss the interrelationship between the Navy's role and the strategic environment. It relates the Navy's fundamental mission to the strategic environment. One way it can accomplish this is by defining the Navy's role as the strategic sea power of the United States. This part shows the uniqueness of the Navy within the United States Military. It answers the question: Why a Navy?

While the strategic environment provides the purpose of the Navy (why); the next component explains the "what" of naval service. The history of the U.S. Navy provides this "what" of naval service. It provides a quick synopsis of over 200 years of service to the country. This history establishes the traditions, customs, and culture of the Navy. History builds the esprit de corps vital to successful military organizations.

All this leads up to providing the how of naval doctrine. It results in the strategic statement of the Navy. The strategic statement answers the question: How the Navy intends to accomplish its strategic (fundamental) mission within the strategic environment. It represents the capstone articulation describing how the USN fights and embodies the sum of naval doctrine. The Navy has called this statement: the maritime strategy, from the sea, forward from the sea, naval expeditionary warfare, or something entirely different depending on the geo-strategic situation. Its content fits a given international security environment. So, the name that the Navy gives it may change, the point is that

doctrine by any name is functional as long as it describes how the Navy intends to operate.

The explanation that stands behind this strategic statement becomes the Navy's strategic and operational warfighting doctrine. It provides enough information to allow Commanders of Naval Forces to coordinate and synchronize their operations. The explanation conceptualizes naval warfare norms with a considerable degree of the flexibility for individual initiative and interpretation by operational commanders. Operational and strategic doctrine must contain flexibility that allows commanders use their innate abilities to counter friction of war. Mahan supported this when he warned, "War cannot be made a rule of thumb, and any attempt to make it so will result in grave disaster"¹

The strategic statement describes in short terms how the Navy fights as a Service, but it must also fight as a member of a joint and/or combined force. Both require a section that explains their particular environments. The section length depends on the detail the Navy feels necessary to operate in those environments. Each should include certain minimum topics (in this case addressing ocean, sea, and littoral operations).

Successful joint warfighting requires a common ground between the services and doctrine meets that requirement. It provides the equivalent of Nelson's "Band of Brothers" across the nation's military. In past wars, these "Bands of Brothers" resulted from shared experiences in combat. Modern operations may demand that such teams begin functioning together in a deterrent role before hostilities begin.

Functional joint teams will also play an important part in the success of the increasing combined/coalition operations.

Joint warfighting must also address command relationships, types of command, and capabilities. Joint command relationships (combatant command, operational control, and tactical control) differ from command relationships within the Navy. The growing uses of joint commands to execute military operations makes understanding the different types of joint commands essential to Commanders of Naval Forces. In addition, joint warfighting requires knowledge concerning the capabilities of other forces available to joint commanders from special operations forces to space forces. The increasing possibility of Commanders of Naval Task Forces assuming the duties as a Joint Force Commander reinforces the need to understand joint operations.

Combined operations involve an entirely different set of requirements than service or joint warfighting. To start with, combined operations entail a completely different command structure that may degrade operations militarily, while enhancing their legitimacy and sharing the costs of blood and treasure. Additional problems exist with difference in training, equipment, doctrine, language, and culture. The combination of these factors makes building teamwork and trust extremely difficult. Doctrine must try to aid naval commanders to operate in this difficult environment.

The next component defines the combat fundamentals of naval operations. It explains how the warfare communities meet the strategic statement. This section answers how each warfare community (surface, submarine, aviation, specwar, and staff) and warfare commanders

(composite, antisubmarine, antiair, antisurface, strike, and space and electronic,) contribute to general naval warfighting. It details the synergistic effects of the warfare communities in naval warfighting. It also needs to include a discussion on combat forces from fleets to single ship groupings (cruiser-destroyers, submarines, amphibious, and carriers). This information provides the other services with the basic knowledge required for their understanding of naval operations.

This section describes how the Navy applies its combat power to achieve its objectives/mission. In doing so, it must also discuss the interrelationships between land, sea, and air power. The section must discuss the synchronization of forces in terms of symmetrical, asymmetrical, and mutual supporting relationships. The understanding of these relationships plays an important role in planning for the application of military power against an enemy. This section needs to point out that enemy forces can also use these relationships against friendly forces. In terms of naval warfare, asymmetrical engagements allow land and/or air power to gain control of the sea in many regions of the world.

This section can also address the most persistent challenge to naval combat operations throughout history, conventional power projection ashore. Current weapon systems' technological capabilities allow the Navy to attack inland targets (both land and air) with devastating results. The Tomahawk missile and strike/attack aircraft can attack both ground and naval targets at great ranges. Naval fighter aircraft's advanced air to air missiles and the shipborne extended range surface to air Standard Missile provide the capability to intercept air

targets over land or sea at extreme ranges. These long range weapon systems give the Navy the ability to attack land targets from the sea.

The U.S. Marine Corps representing the traditional power projection force of the Navy complements these long range weapon systems. The Marine Corps provides the Navy with the ability to seize and control littoral terrain. The ability to synchronize Marine Corps forces with long range weapon systems allows the Navy to influence military operations on land and in the air. These capabilities combine to provide the Navy a significant ability to project naval power ashore.

This ability to project power ashore provides the Navy a significant advantage over the other services in a force projection military. Requirements of naval operations made the Navy into a force projection service from its inception. Current capabilities to project power ashore makes the Navy the Nation's premier initial entry force. The U.S. military's change from a forward based to a force projection military allows the Navy to capitalize on its unique capabilities.

The greatest negative impact of the switch to a force projection military results from a smaller post Cold War Navy. The smaller Navy constrains its ability to conduct the forward presence required by force projection. The Navy simply cannot place naval units in all the world's oceans and seas with the current force. In order to meet the forward presence requirement the Navy uses the practice of stationing naval forces in certain key areas. These naval forces receive the additional responsibility of responding to crises in other areas. The Navy calls this practice tethering.

On the positive side, force projection capitalizes on the unique capability of the Navy to operate at distant locations without the need for a local supply base. The Navy's ability to station forces near crisis areas for long periods makes the Navy the ideal service for force projection. However, the Navy's ability to sustain this capability relies on the retention of the ability to base in theater. A capability that is rapidly shrinking, especially in the Pacific. In addition, the Navy excels at four of the five requirements (forward presence, crisis response, initial reinforcement, follow-on forces, and reconstitution)² of force projection.

The Navy's ability to conduct operations (forward presence) without forward bases enhances its ability to operate in a force projection role. The Navy's wide range of capabilities allows it to quickly react to crisis response situations. The Navy possesses the ability to conduct forced entry operations and then expand those operations with reinforcements. Maritime Preposition Ships (MPS) provide the Navy the capability to receive and support follow-on forces until those forces reach self-sustainment levels.

The reconstitution requirement represents the Navy's one great weakness in force projection operations. The cost and time the Navy takes to reconstitute forces (i.e., replacing lost ships, personnel, and equipment [aircraft]) make this mission very difficult. The need to maintain an industrial base and ship yards to support reconstitution becomes readily apparent. On the other hand, the time and cost associated with building naval forces works against possible adversaries in the same manner.

Sustainment of naval forces becomes more important in a force projection military. The Navy possesses the capability to sustain its forces at sea away from friendly ports for long periods. In addition, it now requires the ability to sustain forces of other services and countries for extended periods until the establishment of shore based logistics. Logistical sustainment in a force projection military becomes the foundation for military operations.

The increase of U.S. involvement in nontraditional military operations operations other than war forces doctrine to address this area. OOTW normally influences military operations by placing constraints on the application of combat power. These operations occur in an uncertain environment of conflict. Military forces operating in MOOTW face non-traditional threats from disease to terrorism. MOOTW missions fall under peacetime and crisis response operations in the spectrum of conflict.

The Navy can add additional guidance to their doctrinal document once it addresses these topics. This additional guidance can include any topic from the principles of war to dynamics of naval operations. It provides the opportunity to discuss specific areas or function that the Navy's leadership considers important to doctrine.

Once done, doctrine must drive force structure to ensure success. Decisions on acquisitions inevitably link the force structure with current and future doctrine given the life-cycle of major combatants. The current doctrine evolution from a global maritime strategy to one of power projection from the sea in the littoral serves as an example of this linkage. The Navy is doing this with a force

structure designed for command and control of the sea with limited power projection around the periphery of the USSR. Moreover, given down sizing the life-cycle of current generation warships are likely to be extended necessitating overhauls and ship alterations to adapt older ships to new missions.

Evaluation and change represent the last component of doctrine development. Evaluation of doctrine does not need actual inclusion in the doctrinal document. The Navy needs to understand that doctrine must undergo continual evaluation for validity. When evaluation discovers weaknesses in doctrine or any of its components, it must possess the capability to make appropriate changes. The Navy cannot write its doctrine in stone. Doctrine must possess the capability to adapt to changes in any of the model's components.

These items represent the minimal topics the Navy needs to address in their capstone (NDP-3 Operations) doctrine publication. The Navy can arrange the order and structure of these topics within the document at their discretion. The paper presents these topics in an order that coincides with chapter two's model of war. Many of these topics will fit under chapter headings such as introduction, operations, joint operations, combined operations, force projection, and sustainment. Remember the target audience of naval doctrine is not only the U.S. Navy, but the other services as well. This methodology can produce an acceptable capstone doctrine document.

Suggestions for Further Research

1. NDC and TRADOC: Recommend additional research on the relevance of the TRADOC experience to restructuring the NDC better

control the institutional learning of the service. A study of the evolution of the organization of TRADOC might provide a model for the NDC. This study can look at both successes and failures of TRADOC's management of the Army's institutional learning system.

2. Recommend the study of NDC application of its model to doctrine development by the Army and Air Force. This process will help validate the assumption that the model of war correctly describes the concept of war.

3. Recommend the study of how joint command relationships might impact service doctrine. How do the Services deal with the requirements of functioning as a commander or member of a Joint Task Force or functional component command (i.e., Joint Forces Air Component Commander)?

Summary

This paper provides an analysis of the methodology used to develop naval doctrine. This methodology includes a short rationale and in some cases provides examples for each component in the process. In the short version (component headings), it provides a checklist of the minimal items needed in a capstone doctrine document. These component headings are: theory, the strategic environment, the role of doctrine, the Navy's role and purpose in the strategic environment, history of the Navy, strategic statement, joint warfighting, warfare communities, force projection, Operations Other Than War, sustainment, guiding principles or tenets, and evaluation.

Endnote

¹Alfred T. Mahan, Naval Administration and Warfare, (Boston, MA: Little & Brown, 1918), 232.

²U.S. Army, FM 100-5, Operations, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1993), chapter 3.

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
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
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